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DISASTF% WARNING SYSTEM STUDY SUMMARY
by B E. LeRoy, J. E. Maloy, R. C. Braley,
C. E. Yrovencher, If. A. Schumaker, and M. E. Valgora
Lewis Research Center
Background
In September, 1969 the Deputy Administrator of the Environmental
Science Service Administration requested in writing that NASA consider
the possibilities inherent in a direct broadcast satellite system for
dissemination of warnings directly to the general public. The Deputy
Administrator provided preliminary system requirements and proposed that
NASA initiate a f..asibility study of such a system. NASA's Lewis Research
Center was given responsibilit-y for the conduct of the study which was
completed in 1970. The resultE of this study showed that a disaster warn-
ing satell 4 ',^ system was feasible with some advancement in technology
In the same year, a Disaster Relief Act was passed which committed the
Federal government to major responsibilities in disaster preparedness,
planning and assistance. Also in 1970, E.S.S.A. became the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (N.0 A.A.) which has prime respon-
sibility for detection, prediction, and warning of natural disasters_
In 1971, a joint NOAA/NASA working group was formed to oversee the
development of a detailed set of disaster warning s ystem requirements and
direct further, study efforts. NOAA formally submitted a system require-
ments document to NASA in mid-1972. These requirements, very briefly
summarized in column 1 of table I, served as the basis for a NOAA-funded,
NASA/LeRC-managed system study conducted by Computer Science Corporation
(CSC). The CSC study considered satellite and terrestrial warning and
data collection aystems and was completed in 1974. It was found that ad-
hering rigidly to the requirements developed in 1972 resulted in exeLssive-
ly higl^, costs for both systems, over $1 billion for 10 years of op^raticr
In the 1974-75 time frame, LeRC personnel reviewed and analyzed the
warning system requirements with the objective of establishi-ig more cost-
effective system concepts. Based on an analysis of NOAH warning mes age
traffic and the cost experience gained by NOAH in the implementation of
the Weather Radio Network, system requirements were refined (table I, col-
umn 2) while maintaining the service intent and much less expensive system
concepts were developed.
The costs of system concepts based on the new requirements were ap-
proximately 40% of the CSC costs. the results of this LeRC study were
presented to NOAA. OMB, OTP and others during 1975
	
Two main poir*_s evolved
from these discussions which altered the scope of the DWS effort.:
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n
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1. 'rhe value of performing only the warning function via satellite
was questioned in view of the cost.
2. OTP suggested that, since satellite utilization for warning only
was low, Le RC consider inclusion of NOAH internal communications as a part
of the system.
(hiring 1976, LeRC defined and costed a satellite system which would
(table 1, column 3):
1. Provide a capability for transmitLing disaster warnings to tale
public.
2. Meet NJAA internal communication requirements.
3. Provide a capability for facsimile and teletype service to "small"
commercial users.
The above conununicaLion /hazard warning system is the subject of the
following material
COMM1'NIUATION/11ALARD WARNING sys'fi-.'m
System Study .)b ject i ve
The Study objectives w'rc ( I ) to examine a dedicaLed S;ILeIIite System
to rcplac,, Improve, or complement No.%.''s data collection, internal com-
munlcutions, and public information dis,cmination system~ for the mid-1980's
(tables I and 11) .,nd (2) comp.ire a &cd i c• Led sate l l i to sys tcm with rl l tcr-
naL iv' methods of providing Lhc wale scrv iccs.
SysLvm Rcquir'ments
'''h ' anunmts of traffic (table 111) w'r' cSlinwLed for various conununi-
cations services to establish dc:, i tiln
 ranges fur the satellite system. 'fhc
hasic communications services consider,] art :	 hill; data, data/cryordination,
w;irning, tacsimile and teletype.
Bilk Data; The bull( data service is dclined as a high speed data relay
of l;lrge blocks of data between ;l few "national" centers or ht-tween ;l
"national" center and a satellite command and dA a acquisition s —;Ition
(CDA).	 I lc l)rr1j'.`ctcd &'sign range for tilt• service durini; the I.IIe 1980'
is between 3 10 h and 9 10 O hit s pc r scco , ul .	 I'hc design range w,Is cs t ab-
lishcd via discussions wish NUS ;nd NKSti p: rsonneI. The lower iimiL ap-
N roximntcs the current Ievcl o  scrv1cr • IOr lh' polar orbiting sysLem.
I he ripper I inli t .I I low, for cxpans ion of wc;Ithcr SaLc I I i t e d;It n }'nvrat ion
of both }solar and gcosynchr. :oous sy,tc71r;.
Ori PW^ CZUALIT^
3Data/Coordinat.i.on: The data/coordination service is defined as a
medium speed (25YI0 3 bits per sec) data relay and voice coordination set-
vice for the dispersal of satellite image products, graphiic materials and
for data collection and "hot line" service internal to the NOAA organi-
zation. The projected design range for this service during the late 1980'5
is 60 to 120 channels. The design range is based on discussions with NOAA
personnel and anticicpates increases in satellite and ground-based fore-
casting aids.
Warning. The warning service is defined as a direct satellite broad-
cast of emergency information to home receivers. This service would com-
plement t_ie planned (337 transmitter) NOAA weather radio network, and would
cover those parts of the country where it is infeasible or impractical to
install radio t,ansmitters. The satellite capability would increase the
population coverage from 91% for the Weather Radio Network alone to 99% for
Weather Radio plus satellite coverage. Continuous weather information
would not be broadcast through the satellite-only warnings. A single sat-
ellite channel (table IV) has been allocated for warning.
FAX, TTY: The facsimile and telet:ype services are specifically in-
tended to meet the requirements of "small" commercial users. The traffic
carried on these channels will be "plain language" products as used by
utt_lities, radio and TV stations, and other external users. The projected
requirements for the late 1980's are 60-80 channels for teletype and 20-40
channels for facsimile (table III).
System Concept
(Tables V, VI, VII)
The system concept (fig. 1) is based on providing all service from a
single satellite equipped with batteries to provide for operation during
eclipse periods. The satellite, located at 120 0 W longitude (fig 2), will
be visible from the contiguous 48 states, Alaska and Hawaii. A "hot spare",
launched about a year after the first satellite, will be maintained to
assure continuity of service. Since the warning channel utilization is low,
the warring service preempts some lower priority services. Power for the
warning channel will be drawn from batteries and other services as required.
The satellite design incorporates engineering extensions of previously
space-proven or space-qualified subsystems. No new technology is renuired.
The satellites will be designed for r seven-year life; it is antici-
pated that average replacement time will oe 5 years (table V).
The ground segment (table V) consists of terminals at "national" cen-
ters, WSFO's and WSO's. With the exception of ti ►e antenna, all terminal
hardware will be redundant (amplifiers, frequency converters, channelizing
equipment, etc.). Peripheral equipment such as computers, and auxiliary
power supplies are not considered as they are already in place in existing
systems.
4Frequency division methods will be employed to provide system access
to the many WSFO's and WSO's. This is currently the most inexpensive means
of providing multiple system access.
It was the intent during the system design to provide the FAX/TTY ser-
vice to small, inexpensive, receive only user owned terminals. Theses small
terminals would receive data directly from the satellite (much as the GOES-
WEFAX systern) and appear "transparent" to the user. That is, service via
satellite would essentially appear no different than service via the tele-
phone network.
System Description
Baseline System: The baseline system consists of the following ele-
ments and capabilities:
- q atelli.te	 - one warning channel
- 120 data/coordination channels
- 9 MBPS bulk data capability
- 80 TTY chatmels
- 40 FAX channels
- control channels and pilot tones.
- Control center for system mairtenance and assignment of satellite access
- 4 "National" centers - each capable of accessing any satellite channel.
- 50 WSFO's	 - each capable of accessing:
- the warning channel
- 20 data/coordination channels
- 10 TTY charnels
- 5 FAX channels
-200 WSO's - each capab?.e of access to:
- 5 data/ coordination channels
- 2 TTY channels
- 1 FAX channel
Note that bulk data is transmitted only between "national" centers and that
warning responsibility rests with the "national" centers and WSFO's.
External to the above elements would be several thousand user-owned
terminals for the reception of facsimile or teletype data.
Costing Method: Computer programs were generated to provide estimates
of satellite development and fabrication costs, satellite recurring costs,
and "turn-key" ground terminal costs. These costs are based on both histori-
cal and technical parameters and current state-of-the-art equipment pri.cFS.
..._____.. 
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Once basic satellite and c	 costs were estimated, a deployment
	
schedule was developed to gener.
	
estimate of the fiscal year phasing
of costs.
Costs for alternative systems were estimated from current tariff sched-
ules or from NOAA cost experience.
Element Costs: The estimated costs for each element of the satellite
system in 1977 dollars is summarized below for the baseline system:
S/C Development plus prototlight
	 $36.2 M
S/C Recurring	 $10.b M
Launch	 $ 8 M
Control Center
	
$ 5.2 M
- OPERATIONS COSTS(1)
Control Center	 $740 K/year
National Centers	 $52 K/terminal/year
WSFO's	 $19 K/terminal/year
WSO's
	 $14 K/terminal/year
External User Terminals (not included in total program cost)
FAX	 $2 K/terminal
"TTY	 $ 1 K/termin g 1
Deployment Schedule (table VI): A deployment schedule was developed
based on the following:
0 The national centers, control center, and one-half the WSFO termi-
nals would be installed prior to the first satellite launch.
• The remaining WSFO terminals would be installed during; the first
year of satellite operation.
• WSO terminals would be installed at a uniform rate over 4 years
beginning in the third operational year.
Total Program Cost (table V1I): Total estimated cost for tFe satel-
lite system is $159 M over a 13-year period which includes 3 years for
initial satellite and ground terminal acquisition and 10 years of syst<:m
.,aeration. Once the system is "in place", after year 5, the estimated
average yearly cost is $8.3 M. The $8.3 M includes $4.6 M/year for oper-
ating costs and $3.7 M/year for satellite replacement assuming a 5-year
satellite replacement cycle.
Responsibility (tables VI anti VII): It has been assumed that NASA
will budget for the design, development and fabrication of the protoflight
T	 and spare saLellites and launch the protoflight. NOAA will budget for all
subsequent spacecraft, launches, and all ground systems.
( "Personnel costs not included.
1
6Cost. Sensitivity- Because of uncertainties in projecting required
connnunications capacity and the extent of the terrestrial network to be
implemented, a cost sensitivity analysis was also conducted. The results
are summarized below for variations about the Baseline System:
Item
	
Impact. on 10-Year Program
Cost (1977 $)
1
r •,
Add or eliminate WSO terminals
lnerease or decrease bulk data rate
Increase or decrease number of data/
coordination channels
Increase or decrease number of FAX
channels
Increase or dec ► :ase number of TTY
channels
Provide for 100% utilization of the
warning channel without interrupting
lower priority services
Eliminate warning capability
^•$200 K/terminal
--$400 K/1")6 bits per second
--$180 K/ ch anne 1
-$130 K/ c.l ► anne 1
-S 40 K/channel
+$ 16 M
-$ 3.6 M
The sensitivity study reveals that substantial changes in the number
of terminals deployed and the system communications capacity are required
to significantly impact the total program cost. The study also shows that
satellite redesign to accommodate varying utilization of the warning channel
will affect the program cost by no more than 10%.
Alternatives (Table VI1I)
NOAA currently provides all services considered for the satellite
system using both terrestrial facilities and commercial satellites. There-
fore, it is important to compare the service costs of the alternative sys-
tems with the satellite system cost.
The costs for extensions of NOAA current communications systems to
provide service equivalent to the satellite system were estimated. The
yearly costs for the alternative systems are summarized below in 1977
R
	
dollars:
Service	 Cost of	 Cost of Increment	 Total
Existing Systems	 Necessary to Equal	 Yearly
Baseline Sat. Capacity	 Cost
Warning	 *	 $3 M	 $ 3 M
Bulk Data	 $ 8 M	 $1.4 M	 $ 2.2 M
Data/Coordination	 $1 5 M	 $3.2 M	 $ 4 7 M
FAX/TTY	 $2.7 M	 1 .6 M	 ,$ 3.3 M
Totals
	
$5-0 M	 $8.2 M	 $i3.2 M
The pla—ed (337 transmitter) NOAA weather radio network is commor
to both t he sateilite system and the ex t ended terrestrial system	
`I
7The total yearly cost (as shown on page 6) would continue indefinitely
as long as the service was desired.
CONCLUSIONS
At NOAA's request, NASA-LeKC has investigated alternative means of
meeting projected NOAA communications requirements in the mid-to-late 1980
time period. It has been shown that, although initially capital intensive
(table VII), the annual cost for providing projected services with an "in-
place" NOAH-owned dedicated satellite system is considerably less than the
cost of providing equivalent services using combined commercial terrestrial
and satellite techniques; $8.3 M/year for the NOAA-owned system and $13.2 M/
year for the commercial alternatives (table VIII). In the deployment sched-
ule assumed, all the ground terminals would be "in-place" after the
fifth year of system operation.
It should also be noted that, with the exception of warning, current
commercial satellite system could provide the special services needed to
meet the projected requirements. For example, RCA-Americom recently dem-
onstrated direct broadcast of wire services for Associated Press and United
Press International. Determination of costs associated with such leased
services was not pursued in this study. Detailed discussions with service
suppliers would be required to firmly establish costs. However, based on
a preliminary assessment, the cost of commercial satellite service would
exceed the cost of a NOAA-owned satellite system by an amount proportional
to profit margins and overall risks assumed by the suppliers.
SatelliCe System
• Initially capital intensive
• After initial capitalization - provides service at less cost than
alternatives.
• Flexibility exceeds the alternatives - NOAA can increase sites
ser-ed with minimum impact on the system.
0 Increasing communications capability within this system does not
significantly increase system cost.
• Provides consumer services at equivalent or rcua ced cost (i.e.,
consumer Zotal terminal investment of $4 K would be paid back in
40 months at $100/montli).
• System would provide services to all NOAA divisions and be centrally
controlled.
8• NOAA can control systems costs directly (labor, hardware, software).
Alternatives
• Funding proportional to capacit- growth - r• ystem expansion is as-
needed.
0 System expansion is more costly than with satellite sy:.tem.
0 Requires no major changes in currant NOAA methods of obtaining ser-
vice.
• NOAA does not exercise control over system-costs - tariffs are es
tablished by service s„pplier.
The key consideration in the selection of advanced communications sys-
tems is the projection of required services. It is the accuracy of these
projections which determines how the above observations should be weighed.
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Figure 13. - flow of water containing dissulved nitru<jen through a converging nozzle.
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